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Labour Commodification and Classification:
An Illustrative Case Study of the New South Wales
Boilermaking Trades, 1860–1920
Ben Maddison

Summary: Labour commodification is a core process in building capitalist society.
Nonetheless, it is given remarkably little attention in labour and social historiography, because assumptions about the process have obscured its historical
character. Abandoning these assumptions, a close study of labour commodification
in the boilermaking trades of late colonial New South Wales (Australia) illustrates
the historical character of the process. In these trades, labour commodification was
deeply contested at the most intimate level of class relations between workers and
employers. This contest principally took the form of a struggle over the scheme of
occupational classification used as the basis of pay rates. It was a highly protracted
struggle, because workers developed strategies that kept the employers’ efforts at
bay for four decades. Employer efforts to intensify the commodity character of
boilermakers’ labour were largely ineffective, until they were given great assistance
in the early twentieth century by the state arbitration system.

The centrality of labour commodification to working-class formation is
widely acknowledged in much of the social theory that informs labour,
social, and working-class historiography.1 In light of this, it is curious that
labour historians have given remarkably little detailed attention to the
process. This is graphically illustrated by the absence of the term in any of
the contributions to Van der Linden and Rojahn’s 1990 edited collection of
twenty-eight national case studies on the Formation of Labour Movements.2 Neither does the term appear actively in the national studies of
Working Class Formation edited by Katznelson and Zolberg (1986), nor in
more recent works such as Tilly and Tilly’s comprehensive 1998 analysis
of Work Under Capitalism.3 These examples could easily be expanded
1. See Shahid Amin and Marcel van der Linden (eds), ‘‘Introduction’’, ‘‘Peripheral’’ Labour?
Studies in the History of Partial Proletarianization, International Review of Social History,
Supplement 4 (Cambridge [etc.], 1996), pp. 1–7, 3.
2. Marcel van der Linden and Jurgen Rojahn (eds), The Formation of Labour Movements 1870–
1914: An International Perspective, 2 vols (Leiden, 1990).
3. Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg (eds), Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century
Patterns in Western Europe and the United States (Princeton, NJ, 1986). Katznelson makes the
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many times over, to show that the term ‘‘labour commodification’’ is
generally absent in approaches to the history of labour across many
national and historical contexts.4
The historiographical absence of the term does not by any means imply
that historians have completely overlooked labour commodification. After
all, labour commodification is the heart of the analytical article of faith
shared by Marxist and non-Marxists alike, that a working class is defined
by its reliance on the sale of the commodity labour power. Because of this
centrality, labour commodification is often implicit in key terms used by
historians. For example, some notion of labour being a commodity is a
necessary background assumption before one can sensibly use the terms
‘‘labour market’’ or ‘‘wage labour’’. Some historians, influenced by
canonical texts of international labour historiography such as Hobsbawm’s 1963 essay ‘‘Custom, Wages and Work-load in NineteenthCentury Industry’’, mobilize the idea of labour commodification more
explicitly.5 Wilentz, for example, referred to how ‘‘masters and contractors’’ in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century United States,
‘‘transformed craft wage labour into a commodity’’, and Bridges used the
concept ‘‘labour as a commodity’’ to summarize the transformations she
described.6 However, even in these examples, as with the literature more
generally, the analysis of labour commodification remains underdeveloped
and marginal.
The main purpose of this article is to reverse this treatment, by placing
labour commodification in the analytical foreground. A critical examination of working-class and labour historiography suggests some of the
reasons why labour commodification has remained relatively underdeveloped. Drawing on this, the elements of an alternative approach are
outlined, in which the static notion of labour commodification as an
‘‘event’’ is replaced with a more dynamic one that sees labour commodification as subject to varying degrees of intensity. How this approach
sole use of the term in this volume, in his Introduction, ‘‘Working Class Formation:
Constructing Cases and Comparisons’’, pp. 3–44, 14; Chris Tilly and Charles Tilly, Work
Under Capitalism (Boulder, CO, 1998).
4. For example, Neville Kirk, Comrades and Cousins: Globalization, Workers and Labour
Movements in Britain, the USA and Australia from the 1880s to 1914 (London, 2003); Greg
Patmore, Australian Labour History (Melbourne, 1991); Roger Magraw, A History of the French
Working Class, 2 vols (Oxford, 1992); Hagen Koo, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of
Class Formation (Ithaca, NY, 2001).
5. Eric Hobsbawm, ‘‘Custom, Wages and Workload in Nineteenth-Century Industry’’, in idem,
Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour (London, 1964), pp. 344–370.
6. Sean Wilentz, ‘‘The Rise of the American Working Class, 1776–1877: A Survey’’, in J. Carroll
Moody and Alice Kessler-Harris (eds), Perspectives on American Labor History: The Problem of
Synthesis (DeKalb, IL, 1989), pp. 83–151, 87; Amy Bridges, ‘‘Becoming American: The Working
Classes in the United States before the Civil War’’, in Katznelson and Aristide, Working Class
Formation, pp. 157–196, 175–79.
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enables a more historical treatment of labour commodification is
illustrated through a case study of boilermaking labour in New South
Wales (NSW) between 1860 and 1920.
This history shows that the struggle over labour commodification in the
boilermaking industry revolved around the issue of control over the
scheme by which boilermaking labour was classified. While at first the
struggle was undertaken almost reflexively, as time went on workers and
employers became increasingly aware of the intimacy of its connection to
the commodification of labour. The nexus between labour commodification and occupational classification became the crucial dynamic around
which the struggle to control the extent of labour commodification was
waged.
As Amin and Van der Linden observe, ‘‘the category pure ‘free wage
labour’ [:::] is an ideal type, the conceptual nucleus of far more complicated
historical realities’’.7 Although the case study presented here is necessarily
limited in scope, it nonetheless illustrates some of the ways that labour
commodification relates to the complex realities that Amin and Van der
Linden refer to. In particular, the study shows that labour commodification was an historically real process that was actively organized, pursued,
and contested even ‘‘after’’ the transition to wage labour.

LABOUR COMMODIFICATION AND LABOUR
HISTORIOGRAPHY

A number of factors have contributed to the general historiographical
neglect of labour commodification. As McNally writes, ‘‘So imbued is
modern society with the commodification of labour, so normalized even
‘naturalized’ has it become, that few bother to question it.’’ And, despite
somewhat overstating the case, Biernacki is right to point out that this
naturalization of the commodity-form of labour means its ‘‘original
strangeness now eludes us’’. This context makes it easier to see why the
sustained historical examination of labour commodification has been slow
to develop.8 It is as though labour commodification is so fundamental that
it has been unconsciously passed over as the necessary but unproblematic
background condition on which labour’s history has been constructed.
This taken-for-granted status has meant that labour commodification has
7. Amin and van der Linden, ‘‘Peripheral’’ Labour?, p. 3.
8. David McNally, ‘‘The Commodity Status of Labour’’, in Gordon Laxer and Dennis Soron
(eds), Not for Sale: Decommodifying Public Life (Peterborough, 2006), pp. 39–54, 43; Richard
Biernacki, The Fabrication of Labour: Germany and Britain, 1640–1914 (Berkeley, CA, 1995),
p. 1. It is rather an overstatement because it ignores the efforts to contest the naturalization of the
commodity form of labour, such as the 1953 statement by the ILO that ‘‘labour is not a
commodity’’ (1953 Report, ILO).
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been treated as a conceptual or theoretical underpinning intrinsic to the
definition of ‘‘working class’’, something that occurred in the dim distant
past, or even more remotely, in the paragraphs of social theory.
Other assumptions have contributed to consigning labour commodification to the historical background as marginal, passive, and inert. The
most important of these is the assumption that labour commodification
begins and ends with the processes that separate direct producers from
ownership of the means of production and alienate them from the products
of their labour. Typically, this occurs when independent producers –
either peasants or artisans – are expropriated and turned into wage
labourers. The resulting workers are forced to sell their abilities for wages:
their labour has thus become a commodity, and a working class has come
into existence.
While this familiar description describes a crucial point in the history of
labour commodification, it portrays labour commodification as an ‘‘event’’
at the ‘‘moment’’ of transition to capitalism. It assumes that the most
significant and problematic phase of labour commodification lies in the
transformation of independent producers into wage-workers: once this has
been achieved, and commodified labour is established as the economic and
social norm, the crucial threshold has been crossed, and the historical
importance of the process ends. This view has kept labour commodification anchored at the threshold, and has made it more difficult for historians
to incorporate the process into the subsequent history of wage-workers.
There are many examples within international historiography of this
logic in operation. Because of the exemplary systematic character of the
analysis employed, it can be seen clearly in Reich’s 1989 periodization of
the ‘‘Three Stages in US Labor History’’. In this schema, the first stage is
characterized by ‘‘initial proletarianization’’, which saw in the six decades
from 1820 ‘‘the emergence of wage labour as the dominant form of
employment’’. This was followed by a period of ‘‘homogenization’’ (c.1890
and c.1940), in which workplace reorganization and mechanization meant
that ‘‘the working conditions faced by the vast majority of workers became
much more similar’’. Stage 3 (1945–1975) was characterized by ‘‘segmentation’’, with massive expansion of ‘‘the secondary labor market [:::]
divergent labor processes, pay rates, and skill levels among the three labor
submarkets’’.9 While this sketch omits much of interest in Reich’s rich and
detailed argument, it nonetheless illustrates how the ‘‘threshold’’ view of
labour commodification anchors discussions of labour commodification to
those very specific times and places in which ‘‘transition’’ has occurred, in
this case stage 1. The subsequent stages involve alterations in the material
and political context in which wage labour is set, with little focus on the
9. Michael Reich, ‘‘Capitalist Development, Class Relations, and Labor History’’, in Moody,
Perspectives on American Labor History, pp. 30–54, 37–41.
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subsequent labour commodifications that the ‘‘initial proletarianization’’
of the first stage has led us to expect.
The vast majority of working-class and labour history operates on the
basis of this ‘‘threshold’’ view, anchoring labour commodification to the
very specific times and places at the shear-points between non-capitalist
and capitalist societies. Although much in this vast body of literature is
germane to the history of labour commodification, its utility is limited by
the fact that it is filtered through other categories and the processes on
which they focus. This happens when, as is typically the case, labour
commodification is treated implicitly as a by-product of ‘‘deskilling’’,
‘‘specialization’’, ‘‘division of labour’’, ‘‘mechanization’’, ‘‘proletarianization’’, or ‘‘industrialization’’. As crucial as these processes are to understanding the history of labour, this approach assumes that labour
commodification is simply an ancillary or automatic accompaniment to
them. This article abandons that assumption, and argues that – like those
processes themselves – labour commodification has its own features,
techniques, language and rhythm.
In summary, the general historiographical absence of the term ‘‘labour
commodification’’ has discouraged historical engagement with the specific
processes named by the term. Because of this, it has been difficult to isolate
the historical dimensions of labour commodification, and this in turn has
made it difficult to identify its relationship to other key factors in the
history of labour. In addition, the ingrained habit of thinking about labour
commodification as a by-product of other processes has rendered the
process almost invisible, ‘‘flattened’’ its historical dimensions and drastically simplified complexity.
HISTORY OF LABOUR COMMODIFICATION IN NEW
SOUTH WALES

Nineteenth-century depictions of labour did not generally display the
‘‘flattened’’ or ‘‘bleached’’ approach to commodity relations that characterizes many twentieth-century accounts.10 Because they were invariably written by people living on the frontier of commodification,
nineteenth-century accounts often display an acute sensitivity to the
controversial impacts of the process itself. Thus, in the nineteenth century
one did not need to be a Marx[ist] to agree with the idea that labour
commodification was contested, and that this made it a continuous
historical process, rather than a one-off and limited ‘‘event’’ whose
completion was marked by the appearance of wages and a labour market.
The widespread nature of this recognition can be seen in its influence even
10. An observation derived from James G. Carrier, ‘‘Introduction’’ in idem (ed.), Meanings of
the Market: The Free Market in Western Culture (Oxford, 1997), pp. 1–67, 6.
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within bourgeois political economy, such as in the comments of a
conservative Australian journalist-politician Andrew Garran, who remarked in 1891 that labour was ‘‘A very remarkable commodity’’, because
It is a live commodity, capable of social and political action, [:::] a commodity
that can think, [:::] talk, [:::] read [:::] attend meetings, [:::] be fired with classenthusiasm, [:::] can link itself hand-in-hand with other like commodities, [:::]
can form trades unions, that can strike, [:::] raise barricades, [:::] can vote, get into
Parliament.11

Garran was an acute observer of the labour and class tensions that were
emerging in late nineteenth-century Australia. His comments capture
what worker resistance and employer actions demonstrated – that the
appearance on the historical stage of this ‘‘live commodity’’ the wageworker, wage labour, and the labour market were only the technical,
formal conditions under which labour commodification announced its
existence. Rather than marking the end of the process of labour
commodification, they ushered in an extended process of struggle between
workers and bosses over the real scope and intensity of commodified
labour.
While Garran’s comments had general applicability across the nineteenth-century capitalist world, they also contributed to the late nineteenth-century colonial debate about the nature of labour as a
commodity.12 On one side of the debate were those who held views such
as Garran’s, often rendered in a more straightforward manner such as in the
comment of the employer E.D.S. Ogilvie in 1879 that ‘‘The price of labour
must rise and fall like the price of any other commodity’’. At the other
extreme were views such as that of the stonemason, William Roylance, that
‘‘Demand and supply does not effect the rate of wages as it does commercial
commodities’’, or the colonial politician who asserted in 1891 that the idea
of labour as a commodity was ‘‘an entirely wrong concept’’.13
As theoretical as it often tended to become, this social discussion over
labour commodification reflected the fact that, while the majority of the
workforce in the later decades of the nineteenth century were classified as
11. Andrew Garran, ‘‘Trade Unions: A Criticism’’, The Australian Economist, 24 August 1891,
II, No. 17, p. 145.
12. Some sense of the geographic range of this contestation can be gained in Biernacki,
Fabrication of Labour, ch. 6; Jurgen Kocka, ‘‘Problems of Working Class Formation in
Germany: The Early Years, 1800–1875’’, in Katznelson and Aristide, Working Class Formation,
pp. 279–351; Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London, 1963);
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra: Slaves, Commoners, and the
Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, MA, 2000), ch. 2.
13. The quotes from Ogilvie and Roylance can be found in ‘‘Select Committee on Assisted
Immigration’’, New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 1879/80, V, qq. 1678–1679, q. 395
respectively. The comment of politician Samuel Griffith can be found in Report of the Royal
Commission on Strikes (Sydney 1891), q. 7200.
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‘‘wage-earners’’ (and their ‘‘dependents’’), this term included a multitude of
labour conditions and their equally varied relationships to commodified
labour. At the start of the period of this study, many skilled urban workers
gained their living by combining self-employment with wage-work. This
was especially true in the metal trades, where engineers and blacksmiths
were intermittently employed on railways and in shipyards, resorting to
manufacturing metal goods on their own account when wage-work ran
out – or indeed vice versa. This kind of alternation between waged and
independent work was also prevalent amongst highly skilled building
craftsmen, such as carpenters and joiners, as well as other skilled workers.
While by the 1890s this practice was generally much diminished, and wagework had become more permanent, it was still possible in the 1880s and
1890s for a Sydney wheelwright to eke out a precarious living, alternating
wage-work with making carts and furniture on his own account.14
Alluvial or ‘‘surface’’ gold miners were a distinctive group of workers
who occupied an equally ambivalent position in relation to the commodity-form of labour and wage-work. During the 1850s tens of thousands of
British, European, and Chinese people journeyed to Australia, many of the
British and Europeans spurred on by the independence from wage-labour
that the hope of a lucky strike on the goldfields held out. Whilst these
hopes were usually unfulfilled, after the peak of the gold rush had passed in
the late 1850s many thousands stayed in Australia. Through the later
decades of the nineteenth century a significant number of independent
alluvial gold miners journeyed from goldfield to goldfield, and formed a
semi-nomadic class on the periphery of the wage-earning world.15 Many
others sought similar independence from wage-work by taking advantage
of reforms in the land laws in the 1860s, and established small family farms.
These were usually marginal affairs, hovering between subsistence
agriculture of a sort, selling a minimal surplus on local markets and making
up the shortfall by engaging in temporary wage labour, often as seasonal
shearers. The males of the farm might be classified as ‘‘wage-workers’’ by
the late nineteenth-century statisticians (whose work subsequent generations of labour and social historians rely on), but only by erasing the large
amounts of totally uncommodified labour of women and children that
underpinned the male ‘‘wage earner’’.16 Neither was the uncommodified
non-wage-work of women and children confined to the rural areas – many
14. See Ken Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers in Australia 1852–1920 (Canberra, 1970), ch.
1; Graeme Davison and Shirley Constantine (eds), Out of Work Again: The Autobiographical
Narrative of Thomas Dobeson 1885–1891, Monash Publications in History, No. 6 (Monash
University, Clayton, VIC, 1990).
15. Geoffrey Serle, The Golden Age: A History of the Colony of Victoria, 1851–1861
(Melbourne, 1977); Geoffrey Blainey, The Rush That Never Ended: A History of Australian
Mining, 3rd edn (Melbourne, 1978).
16. Accounts of the socio-economic conditions of the small farmers (known as ‘‘selectors’’) can
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an early twentieth-century Sydney waterfront family depended on a
variety of uncommodified activities of women and children.17
If wage-work was far from universal, it followed that neither was the
money form of the wage. The payment of wages in money as a universal
medium of exchange was important, both as a precondition for more
intensively commodifying labour and the establishment of a labour
market. While there were many occupations in which pure wage payment
was the norm, it was nevertheless the case that in the 1860s some urban
employers continued an older practice of paying workers in goods as well
as money.18 While this practice disappeared from urban areas in the 1870s,
it persisted for the thousands of workers who worked as pastoral labourers
in the sheep and cattle-raising industries, and whose remuneration was a
composite – of food and accommodation, alcohol and tobacco, and a
money amount that was often still paid annually into the 1860s and 1870s,
and even the 1880s in some cases.19
This was for white, male workers – for Aboriginal workers in the late
nineteenth century pastoral industry, money wages – where they existed –
were often paid into police bank accounts for ‘‘safe keeping’’, after
amounts for alcohol, opium, tobacco, food, and accommodation was
subtracted. Often, the latter were provided directly by indigenous
workers, utilizing traditional economic practices, and thus constituting a
massive subvention to the pastoral employers, especially in the northern
Australian cattle industry, where indigenous stockmen provided the bulk
of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century workforce.20 These
conditions existed alongside those of indentured Melanesian labour, which
formed the workforce of the colonial sugar plantations from the 1870s,
be found in Duncan Waterson, Squatter, Selector and Storekeeper: A History of the Darling
Downs 1859–93 (Sydney, 1968); John McQuilton, The Kelly Outbreak 1878–80: The
Geographical Dimensions of Social Banditry (Carlton, VIC, 1987); Bill Gammage, Narrandera
Shire (Narrandera, NSW, 1986); Graeme Buxton, The Riverina 1861–1891 (Melbourne, 1967);
Michael Cannon, The Roaring Days (Mornington, 1998). See the account of women’s and
children’s roles in family farm work in Beverley Kingston, My Wife, My Daughter and Poor
Mary Ann: Women and Work in Australia (Melbourne, 1977), and their erasure by statisticians in
Katrina Alford, Production or Reproduction: An Economic History of Women in Australia 1788–
1850 (Melbourne, 1984), and Desley Deacon, ‘‘Political Arithmetic: The Nineteenth Century
Australian Census and the Construction of the Dependent Woman’’, Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society, 11 (1985), pp. 27–45.
17. Margo Beasley, ‘‘Sara Dawes and the Waterfront Domestic Economy’’, (Ph.D., Department
of History, University of Wollongong, 2003); Kingston, My Wife, My Daughter and Poor Mary
Ann, chs 3 and 4.
18. John Child, Unionism and the Labour Movement (Melbourne, 1971), p. 38.
19. John Merritt, The Making of the AWU (Melbourne, 1986); Brian Fitzpatrick, A Short
History of the Australian Labour Movement (Melbourne, 1944).
20. Ann McGrath, Born in the Cattle: Aborigines in Cattle Country (Sydney, 1987); Dawn May,
Aboriginal Labour and the Cattle Industry : Queensland from White Settlement to the Present
(Melbourne, 1994).
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often growing their own food and receiving wages intermittently or on
completion of their several year period of service.21
Thus the Australian ‘‘labour market’’ was a complex mix of ‘‘intermediate’’, ‘‘semi-proletarian’’, and wage-workers.22 This variegated pattern
was spawned by the energetic growth of the colonial economy, which
expanded at an annual rate of around 4 per cent between 1860 and 1890,
leading historians to characterize this period as ‘‘The Long Boom’’. While
the pastoral industry continued to be the dominant economic activity
during the Long Boom, there was considerable economic diversification
into urban manufacturing, building, and transport sectors. In the process
an array of production forms and employment relations proliferated:
sectors like clothing and footwear industries retained many of the features
of pre-industrial production, such as putting-out. At the same time, in
sectors such as the metal trades, older workshop and artisanal relations
gave way to more recognizably industrial conditions.23
The small-scale but expanding nature of economic activity and the
opening-up of small-scale, state-assisted farming, meant that colonial
society to 1890 was characterized by considerable social mobility out of
the working class. While in the fine grain the Long Boom was punctuated
by periods of economic downturn, none compared to the depression that
hit the colony in 1890–1894. The 1890s depression brought economic
growth to an abrupt halt, closed off the avenues for social mobility, and the
flexibilities of the earlier colonial order were reduced as the class-structure
solidified. Increasingly, being born working-class was a permanent lifelong condition.24
As a key industrial skill, the evolution of boilermaking labour in colonial
New South Wales (NSW) was closely related to these general economic
and industrial conditions. Boilermaking in late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century NSW was clustered around the ship-repair, engineering, and railway industries that serviced the transport needs of the NSW
21. See Charlie Fox, Working Australia (Sydney, 1991) ch. 6.
22. This typology is developed in Amin and van der Linden, ‘‘Peripheral Labour’’?, pp. 3–5.
23. For the general economic conditions see Noel G. Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic
Development 1861–1900 (Canberra, 1976); Edward Shann, An Economic History of Australia
(Melbourne, 1948); A.G.L. Shaw, The Economic Development of Australia, 7th edn (Melbourne,
1980). For general views of the labour conditions see Fox, Working Australia, chs 3–6; Raelene
Frances, The Politics of Work: Gender and Labour in Victoria 1880–1939 (Melbourne, 1993);
Ray Markey, ‘‘The Labour Aristocracy and Productive Re-organization in NSW, c.1880–1900’’,
Australian Economic History Review, 28 (1988), pp. 43–59, and idem, The Making of the Labor
Party in New South Wales 1880–1900 (Kensington, NSW 1988).
24. The preceding period of flexibility, and the solidification of the capitalist class structure from
1890, is covered by a host of historians including Stuart Macintyre, The Oxford History of
Australia, IV, 1901–1942: The Succeeding Age (Melbourne, 1986), pp. 45, 303, and idem, A
Colonial Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries (Melbourne, 1991), p. 186.
Macintyre is the most recent exponent of the ‘‘hardening’’ image. For an earlier example see
Fitzpatrick, Short History of the Australian Labour Movement, p. 14.
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colonial economy. In the period of this study, the specifically boilermaking workforce numbered around 1,000 ‘‘skilled’’ and ‘‘unskilled’’ workers.
In the 1870s, handwork and craft skills were at a premium. Specific ideas
about the hierarchy of skill within boilermaking were implanted in
colonial NSW by early immigrant boilermakers, such as those who were
brought from Britain to build breweries in 1855. They expressed, in classic
British artisanal style, that a competent, well-trained boilermaker had the
‘‘all-round’’ boilermaking abilities that had been developed during an
apprenticeship. In particular, excellence in the activities of ‘‘rivetting’’,
‘‘plating’’, and ‘‘caulking’’ were considered to be the most important.
Most boilermakers were employed in ship-repair and minor shipbuilding,
the construction of boilers for the increasingly steam-driven production,
rail, and shipping transport systems that were developing from the 1870s, in
steel-wagon and rail construction and assembly workshops, and on the
construction of iron bridges throughout the colony. The ‘‘craftsmen’’ were
‘‘assisted’’ by offsiders who were classified as ‘‘unskilled’’. Their work
involved a range of activities, from heavy manual lifting, to more demanding
work using lifting tackle, cranes, hammer, press, and forge. Technologically,
there was a move towards increased mechanization of boilermaking around
the turn of the century, with the introduction of steam-riveters and shears.
Nonetheless, handwork and craft skill continued to be important elements
of boilermaking labour well into the twentieth century.25
The centre of the artisanal boilermaking cultures and structures were the
Sydney shipbuilding yards and the government railway workshops. Here,
the collective artisanal ethos and structures were strongest, and the
extremely varied nature of work in and around the shipyards was a material
basis that sustained the idea of properly qualified boilermakers’ ‘‘all round’’
skills. Beyond this core, in the railway-wagon assembly manufactories such
as Hudson’s, or in bridge-construction sites in the rural areas, the artisanal
structures and ethos were weaker. In these sites, the distinctions between
‘‘craft’’ and ‘‘labouring’’ were less sharply drawn and more difficult to
maintain, and the employment of non-apprenticed workers and specialists
rather than ‘‘all-round’’ men was more prevalent.26 As will be seen below,
25. The British origins of these distinctions can be traced in Keith McClelland and Alistair Reid,
‘‘Wood, Iron and Steel: Technology, Labour And Trade Union Organization in the Shipbuilding
Industry, 1840–1914’’, in Royden Harrison and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Divisions of Labour
(Brighton, 1985), pp. 151–184. Their use in the Australian context can be followed in John
Shields, ‘‘Skill Reclaimed: Craft Work, Craft Unions, and the Survival of Apprenticeship in New
South Wales, 1860–1914’’, (Ph.D., University of Sydney, 1990), pp. 143–148, 174–187 [hereafter
‘‘Skill Reclaimed’’]. For general characterizations of the colonial iron trades, see Buckley, The
Amalgamated Engineers, ch. 1; Tom Sheridan, Mindful Militants: The Amalgamated Engineering Union in Australia 1920–1972 (Melbourne, 1975), ch. 1. Markey, ‘‘The Aristocracy of
Labour [:::] in NSW, c. 1880–1900’’ provides a comprehensive examination of the changes
towards the end of the ‘‘Long Boom’’.
26. See Shields, ‘‘Skill Reclaimed’’, pp. 174–187.
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Figure 1. Rivetters building the Murray Bridge, New South Wales, early twentieth century.
State Library of South Australia; image no SLSA: B 3161. Used with permission.

these variations from the artisanal norm were to become important for the
way that the commodification of boilermaking labour evolved.
Despite some fluctuations, the colonial ‘‘labour market’’ for boilermakers and other occupations more generally was buoyant between 1860
and 1890, and in this period employment for boilermakers expanded, in
line with employment more generally. In the 1850s and 1860s skilled
boilermakers oscillated between periods of self- and waged employment,
like their counterparts elsewhere in the metal trades. However, the size of
dockyards, railway yards, and steam-driven factory equipment expanded
from the 1870s, so that by the early twentieth century wage labour had
become the permanent condition of boilermaking labour.
Accompanying this expansion, and especially during the 1870s, was a
substantial growth in the formation of permanent unions across the
workforce. During this decade at least six craft and unskilled unions were
formed in the NSW metal trades. This had the effect of separating out into
distinct ‘‘crafts’’ the previously entangled and impermanent attempts at
organization. While by the time the depression hit in 1890 union coverage
in the metal trades was comprehensive, overall workforce unionization
was far less impressive, covering only around 20 per cent of the work force.
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Boilermakers were thus one of the more privileged sections of the working
class.27
THE CONTEST OVER LABOUR COMMODIFICATION,
1860 – 1890

While the small size of colonial manufacturing industry meant that many
boilermakers in mid-nineteenth-century NSW fluctuated between selfemployment and wage-work, the existence of wage rates (5s a day in 1853)
shows that boilermaking labour was at least formally commodified in the
mid-century.28 However, it was not until the 1860s and early 1870s that
the development of larger ironworks, dockyards, and railway workshops
started to employ boilermaking labour on a more permanent basis. This in
turn stimulated the formation of the United Society of Boilermakers and
Iron-Shipbuilders (USB) in 1873, the first permanent trade union
specifically for boilermaking labour.29
From its inception, the USB disrupted the employers’ expanding
capacities to control the conditions under which boilermaking labour
was employed. During the 1860s, the larger ironmasters had taken
advantage of ephemeral employment conditions and the chronically
disorganized state of the embryonic metal trades unionism, and had begun
to employ unskilled workers on work that had traditionally been claimed
as the province of the skilled. After a struggle, in which the early union of
the ‘‘unskilled’’ boilermakers’ assistants proved more of an antagonist than
the employers, by 1876 the USB had effectively divided the boilermaking
workforce into the ‘‘skilled’’ and ‘‘unskilled’’ sections typical of British
craft unionism.30
Drawing a rigid boundary between the ‘‘skilled’’ and ‘‘unskilled’’ was the
first step in the evolution of the USB’s defensive strategy against their
employers commodifying tendency. At the most basic level, it meant that
the union now had an enhanced capacity to influence both the supply of
27. For these developments see J.T. Sutcliffe, A History of Trade Unionism in Australia
(Melbourne, 1967), pp. 45–89; Ben Maddison, ‘‘Skill and the Commodification of Labour in
New South Wales, 1840–1915’’ (Ph.D, Department of History and Politics, University of
Wollongong, 1996), ch. 9. Markey, The Making of the Labor Party in New South Wales,
calculates that in 1891 the overall union coverage in NSW was 21.5 per cent of the workforce. See
also Ian Turner, Industrial Labour and Politics: The Dynamics of the Labour Movement in
Eastern Australia 1900–1921 (Canberra 1965), ch. 1 and Appendix III, p. 250.
28. T.A. Coghlan, Wealth and Progress of New South Wales 1890–91 (Sydney, 1891), p. 681, and
idem, Labour and Industry in Australia, (Melbourne, 1968), I, p. 60, II, ch. 7.
29. See Report of Proceedings, Second Intercolonial Trades Union Congress, Melbourne, 1884,
J. McGowan (USB Secretary), p. 107. McGowan mentioned ‘‘the twenty-nine years of the
Boilermakers’ Association in Sydney’’.
30. These processes can be traced in, Sydney Trades and Labour Council, Minutes of General
Meetings 1871–1876, 16 May, 17 June, 12 August 1875; 17 February 1876, University of
Wollongong Archives, D 167.
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Figure 2. Men at work in the boiler shop at the Ballarat North Railway workshops, early
twentieth century.
Reproduced by courtesy of Museum Victoria; image MM 001581. Used with permission.

‘‘skilled’’ boilermaking labour, and the price at which it was sold. To be
effective this strategy required the union to enroll a majority of ‘‘skilled’’
boilermakers. To this end, the USB built widespread coverage of skilled
boilermaking workers during the 1870s. This was achieved by a pragmatic
policy that opened membership to the spectrum of ‘‘non-assistants’’ – be
they craft boilermakers with the full repertoire of boilermaking abilities
(‘‘all-rounders’’), or the more specialized workers – riveters, caulkers and
platers – that had been allowed to flourish under the employers’
freewheeling employment practices of the 1860s.
By the early 1880s the vulnerabilities in these arrangements were
becoming evident. The pragmatic admittance policies of the 1870s resulted
in a membership with a variety of levels of boilermaking skill. The USB
acknowledged this variegation in its official wages scale, which allowed
members to be paid at rates ranging from 10s to 18s a day.31 In 1880 and
1881 large Sydney employers such as Morts Dock and Atlas Works
31. United Society of Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders, General Minutes, 10 August 1878
gives the upper and lower limits – Boilermakers’ and Blacksmiths’ Society of Australia –
Records, 1876–1972, NSW State Library, MLMSS 2422 [hereafter USB minutes], Minute Book
3, K52391.
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attempted to intensify the commodity character of boilermaking labour by
exploiting the existence of the wages scale. When the specific requirements
of the work-in-hand suited, they dismissed individual ‘‘all-round’’ boilermakers, with their premium rates of pay, and re-hired those same men, and
paid them as if they were specialists.
This was an attempt to intensify the commodity-character of boilermaking labour, because rather than paying for the ‘‘skilled worker’’,
employers were now starting to pay only for the specific ‘‘bits’’ of skill
they needed (caulking, riveting, plating), rather than all the abilities of a
skilled worker with ‘‘all-round’’ skill. In addition, the payment for a craft
boilermaker was always more than a payment for his technical abilities,
embodying as it did a recognition of the more intangible status of the
craftsman. In trying to pay the craftsman for the work that he was required
to do, rather than on the basis of a pay rate that, at least in part, reflected
some intangible component of status, the ironmasters were trying to
remove some of the social and cultural integuements, and thereby
transform the commodity status of skilled boilermaking labour. In other
words, employers were trying to align more precisely the amount they
paid for labour with the quality of labour power (‘‘level of skill’’) they
required for the work.
The ironmasters’ first concerted attempt to reshape the ‘‘rules of the
game’’ in line with a commodifying logic provoked considerable conflict
and debate within the USB. When a union delegate reported in 1881 that at
Morts Dock ‘‘some of the men, having been discharged were re-employed
at a lower rate of wages’’, the USB took its first significant steps, when one
of the members proposed ‘‘having a standard scale of wages’’.32
However straightforward establishing a standard rate of wages appears
to be in hindsight, from inside the Boilermakers’ Union the process was
one of great complexity and controversy. The union records capture this
complexity, and in doing so offer a fascinating insight into how a group of
workers enmeshed within the complexities of the labour commodification
process, thought their way through the difficulties to evolve an effective
policy. The 1870s’ membership policy of admitting both specialists and
‘‘all-rounders’’ meant that by the early 1880s a third of the USB
membership were specialists, and the rest ‘‘all-rounders’’.33
Thus, when a USB delegate from Mort’s Dock March 1881 introduced
the motion ‘‘that there be a standard scale of wages for members of the
Society with a minimum (say) of 14d’’, he was well aware of the contentious
nature of the issue, appending to the motion the unusual condition that
32. Ibid., 15 March 1881.
33. This figure is deduced from comments of Secretary McGowan, who in considering a
proposal for recognition of a two-tiered wage scale by the USB, reckoned that the higher rate
would apply to ‘‘about two-thirds of the members’’, leaving one-third as specialists. See ibid., 27
July 1882.
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‘‘Voting on this subject be by Ballot’’ (original emphasis).34 Over a couple of
months of discussion the boilermakers’ understanding of their position
within the commodification process, and the strategy that might effectively
deal with it, developed considerably. Where the first motion had allowed
for ‘‘a standard scale of wages’’, this equivocation was removed in the final
formulation put forward by Brother Crystal in July 1881 ‘‘that the time has
now arrived for this Society to have a fixed rate of wages’’.35
This form of words approached the issue of a standard rate of wages
much less ambiguously, and at the same time catalysed tensions arising
from the variegated character of the union’s membership. A significant
section of those who spoke against the motion deplored the idea of a
standard rate, and supported the continuation of the system of setting
wages according to the flexibility allowed by the broad scale of wage
rates. One speaker argued that ‘‘it was not right to fix a rate of wages as
some of the older men might not be able to get employed at the
required rate’’. Another asked what was to happen to those members
‘‘who might be thrown out of employment by this resolution on
account of his employer not thinking them worth the wages’’, and
opposed the motion because ‘‘he considered it an injustice to inferior
men of whom there were several in the society’’. Significantly enough
for the future, the advocates of these perspectives argued that, instead of
a fixed rate, the motion should be amended to establish ‘‘two rates of
wages [:::] for First and Second class riveters [,] the men to classify
themselves’’, First Class being those for whom riveting was only one
among a number of abilities, and Second Class being those for whom
riveting was their sole speciality.36
These arguments – and especially the amendment, with its proposal for
a self-classification of boilermakers into two ‘‘grades’’ – were ineffective in
diluting the much stronger level of support within the union for the
principle of a standard rate of wage. The strongest current of opinion
accepted that there were specialists in the union, but argued that this did
not justify ‘‘grading’’ and paying members at different rates, because all
were of the same level of skill. This was a particularly important
perspective in rebutting the suggested classification of riveters into two
grades, because as one member pointed out ‘‘a great many men were not
first class riveters’’, and yet could claim to be equally skilled as the latter.
Under the proposed scheme of classification these men would be classed as
Second Class and would consequently ‘‘get lower pay than their equals’’,
despite the fact that they ‘‘could do other work equally well or better
perhaps’’ than ‘‘First Class’’ riveters.37
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid., 29 March 1881.
Ibid., 18 July 1882.
Ibid.
Ibid., 27 July 1882.
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Ultimately the arguments in favour of adopting the standard wage
prevailed, and the motion establishing a standard minimum wage rate
(of 14d per hour) was carried by a ‘‘very large majority’’. The
seriousness with which this was considered is indicated by the passing
of a further motion that provided for an extremely heavy punishment of
£5 for a first infringement and expulsion for the second in the case of
‘‘any member proved to be working at a lesser rate of wages than the
minimum’’.38
The decision to establish a standard wage rate, rather than a graduated
scale of wages based on ‘‘grading’’, was the hub around which USB
oriented itself for the following quarter century. By replacing the scale of
wages with a standard wage rate, and strictly enforcing members’
adherence to it, the USB had built an effective defence against the
increasingly evident intention of iron trades employers to divide up the
boilermaking workforce in order to pay more precisely for the abilities
that they needed – that is to say, to intensify the commodity character of
their labour, as they had begun to do in 1880. This was absolutely critical
for the development and character of the USB from 1880, because the
standard wage halted the tendency to create a space for an intermediate
category of worker (the ‘‘Second Class riveter’’) between ‘‘skilled’’ and
‘‘unskilled’’.
From this time on, union strategy came to pivot not simply on
enforcement of the standard wage, but more fundamentally on the
USB’s ability to project itself as a union whose members were equal in
level of skill, whether they were ‘‘all-round’’ boilermakers or specialists.
The difficulties that this entailed, even in the 1880s, was indicated in
the equivocations and fears expressed by one member in a discussion
over whether two young men should be admitted. Uncertain as to their
levels of ability, he commented that ‘‘he would not take upon himself
the responsibility of proposing’’ them as members because while
admitting them ‘‘might be the means of getting them journeymen’s
wages’’, he had ‘‘some doubt as to whether [they] would get the
Minimum [i.e. standard] rate’’. If this was the case, he continued, and
‘‘the money was refused ‘‘to the men by their employers’’, ‘‘the Society
would be placed in an awkward position’’, by revealing to the
employers that its membership was heterogeneous in ability.39 This
was a prescient anticipation of a central vulnerability which in 1880
was a quarter of a century away – the union’s claim to standard wages
rested on its ability to project itself as a community of equally skilled
workers.

38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 12 September 1882.
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EMPLOYERS AND THE TECHNIQUE OF
COMMODIFICATION

The combination of the relatively propitious economic climate of the
1870s and 1880s, and the growth of the USB alongside a general growth of
iron trades unionism in the period, meant that most iron trades employers
perhaps had little option than to accept the containment of labour
commodification in boilermaking by the standard wage. In addition, the
relatively small scale of colonial engineering and dockyard works meant
that flexible and all-round craft skill continued to be important, and this
probably made bearable the practice of paying the standard rate to USB
members, as well as to the ‘‘unskilled’’ boilermakers. Their unions had also
adopted the principle after 1880, establishing a standard wage of 7s per
day.40
While iron trades employers had little choice at this stage but to accept
these limits to labour commodification, they nonetheless sought to achieve
the same ends through alternative means. From the time that the standard
wage was established in the early 1880s, the ironmasters persisted in the
project of tapping the reservoirs of labour power that they believed were
being withheld from them, by trying to establish piecework. The
advantage of piecework was, as Thomas Irons (manager of Meadowbank
Engineering Works) put it in 1908, that it instilled in each individual
worker ‘‘a commercial knowledge of his own value’’.41 Implicit in this was
the employer’s plaint that workers had a ‘‘non-commercial’’ view of the
value of their own labour, a view perpetuated by unions and the practice of
paying according to the standard wage. Paying by piecework would more
accurately align the wage paid with the ‘‘real’’ value of individuals’ labour.
The USB, aware of these implications, steadfastly refused to consent to
piecework in boilermaking on the many occasions that the ironmasters
tried to introduce it. Despite recurrent attempts through the 1880s and
1890s, by the early twentieth century the ironmasters were as far away as
ever from being able to introduce piecework. In 1903/4 the Iron Trades
Employers’ Association (ITEA) was still unsuccessfully trying to get ‘‘the
principle [of piecework] [:::] admitted as far as the [USB] rules were
concerned’’.42
It was probably the effectiveness of USB resistance to the employers’
repeated attempts to establish piecework that prompted the latter, during
the 1890s, to reassess their strategies for intensifying the commodity
character of labour power. Thwarted in their attempts to introduce
piecework, the employers now began to attack the principle of the
40. See Shields ‘‘Skill Reclaimed’’, pp. 175–177.
41. Amalgamated Society of Engineers, New South Wales District v. Iron Trades Employers
Association, 1908. Transcript. New South Wales State Archives, 2/111, vol. 58, p. 554.
42. Sydney Morning Herald, 21 April 1904, p. 5; Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1903, p. 7.
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standard wage and its foundation in union control over occupational
classification. The onset of this attack was indicated by Henry Hudson, the
director of Hudson Brothers Engineering Co and ITEA President, when
he commented in 1891 that ‘‘some men can earn twice as much as others,
and great difficulty must necessarily arise by having any standard rate of
wages, where one man would be overpaid and the other not paid
enough’’.43 Delayed by a severe depression in the mid-1890s, it was not
until the economic recovery later in the decade that this analysis began to
be applied more instrumentally.
It was this logic that informed Mr Broad, the Superintendent of the
Government Dockyard, when he commented in 1899 that paying all
boilermaking labourers in the Dock the standard 7s a day constituted
‘‘unfairness to the skilful labourer’’ [sic], because ‘‘he only gets the same as
the absolutely unskilled, and I may say, comparatively useless one’’. Broad
thought that the latter should be paid ‘‘at a lower rate – say 6s a day’’.44 In
making these discriminations between two different levels of skill within
the boilermaking labourers, Broad was articulating what was to become
the heart of the ironmasters’ labour commodification strategy.
By the start of the twentieth century iron trades employers had thus
developed the strategy of eroding union control of occupational
classifications. That this was consciously and concretely linked by the
employers to an objective of intensifying labour commodification became
apparent in a dispute that erupted in 1901 between the Iron Workers
Assistants’ Association (IWA) and ITEA. The dispute, which severely
disrupted work in Sydney’s engineering shops and dockyards for eight
weeks, was ostensibly about the employers’ attempt to reduce the
minimum rate of pay for IWA members from 7s to 6s 6d a day. Yet it
soon became clear that something more than a struggle over sixpence was
at stake. As a journalist observed ‘‘the proposal of the employers is really
to grade the employees’’.45
Innocuous as it may appear nowadays, the employers’ determination to
‘‘grade’’ the employers, and to thereby establish a more fine-grained
scheme of occupational classification, was controversial at the time, as the
discussion over just this issue in the USB twenty years earlier indicated
that it would be. Although initially reluctant to admit their objective
publicly, in private the ITEA explained to the Sydney Marine Underwriters’ Association that they were ‘‘endeavouring to grade the Labouring
men’’.46 As the dispute continued, the employers’ coyness receded and
43. Report of the Royal Commission into Strikes, Minutes of Evidence, q. 3788.
44. ‘‘Report of Committee of Inquiry on the Working of the Government Docking Establishment, at Biloela (Cockatoo Island)’’, New South Wales Parliamentary Papers, 1899, III, p. 89.
Broad was Superintendent of the New South Wales Government Dockyard.
45. Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 1901, p. 7.
46. Mort’s Dock and Engineering Company, Out Letter Books [hereafter Mort’s Dock Out
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they publicly revealed that they were trying to dismantle the existing
practice of paying all union members at the same rate. The ITEA hoped to
replace this system of payment with one that would ‘‘see (IWA members)
classified [:::] according to their abilities’’, and paid ‘‘according to their
value’’ so that ‘‘First class men’’ would be paid 7s and ‘‘second class men’’
6s 6d.47
We can see in these comments about value how consciously the strategy
of eroding the standard wage and job classification was connected to plans
to intensify the commodity character of boilermaking labour. By breaking
apart the monolithic occupational category ‘‘ironworkers’ assistants’’ into
its component parts, the employers hoped to enhance their capacity to
align more precisely the amount they paid for labour with its quality. By
doing so they would crack open and harvest the reservoirs of labour power
they believed lay within the bodies of workers, but which was being
withheld from them by union controls over occupational classifications. It
was precisely this relationship between labour commodification and
occupational classification to which ITEA President and dockyard
manager J.P. Franki referred to when he explained during the 1901
dispute that the employers were trying to ‘‘classify the work’’, and in this
way ‘‘fix a value on it on a commercial basis’’.48
While the 1901 dispute resulted in a compromise agreement, its broader
significance lay in the fact that it was the ITEA’s first practical test of the
difficulties that might be encountered in trying to translate their analysis of
the nexus between labour commodification and occupational classification
more widely across the skilled and unskilled workers in the boilermaking
workforce. The ITEA objectives in the dispute were helpfully summed up
by the Sydney Morning Herald, which maintained that occupational
‘‘classification [:::] might naturally [sic] be supposed to belong of right to
[the employers] and not to the men’’.49 Thus, at the end of the 1901 dispute
the ITEA continued – with an eye to the future – to ‘‘claim the right as
Employers to grade the men according to their ability’’.50
STATE ARBITRATION AND OCCUPATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION 1901 – 1915

If the ironmasters’ found it difficult to give this ‘‘right’’ practical effect in
relation to the unskilled, this was even more the case when it came to the
skilled workers in the USB. Even though many trade unions were
Letter Books], State Library of New South Wales, MLMSS 434, Franki to Woodthorpe, 21 June
1901, fos 440–441.
47. Sydney Morning Herald, 25 May 1901, p.10.
48. Daily Telegraph, 1 July 1901, p. 9.
49. Sydney Morning Herald, 11 July 1901, p. 4.
50. Mort’s Dock Out Letter Books, Franki to the Secretary of the ITEA, 25 July 1901, fo. 452.
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decimated during the 1890s, in the early twentieth century iron trades
employers continued to be confronted by skilled workers intent on
resisting, from positions of considerable strength and status, all attempts to
erode the structures and strategies they had devised over the preceding
quarter century. Confronted with this industrial equation, the initial
approach of the iron trades employers in the several years after 1901 was to
pursue traditional strategies, such as seeking wage and overtime rate
reductions, removal of limitations on apprenticeship, the lifting of
restrictions on the numbers of machines which could be worked by one
worker, and agreement to work under piecework conditions.51
Yet the stance of the ironmasters in regard to the skilled workers was
now marked by an aggression largely absent from their pre-1890 approach.
Whereas previously, the ITEA had shown itself willing to work within the
framework of craft unionism and its rules, now there was a distinct
drawing away from that approach. Reflecting this shift, the ITEA pointed
out in 1903 that ‘‘There were several things in the rules of the various
unions which the employers had [previously] not taken cognizance of, and
they had worked harmoniously without taking notice of them.’’ Now,
however, they hoped that ‘‘some of the restrictions might be removed and
others modified’’.52 The unions remained intransigent on these issues (they
included piecework, apprenticeship, and machine working), and in 1904
the ITEA filed claims against the USB in the New South Wales Arbitration
Court, albeit without much optimism about securing a favourable
outcome.53
The New South Wales Arbitration Court had been established by the
New South Wales government in 1901 to regulate the wages and
conditions of work in specific occupations. Initially greeted with
scepticism by many trade unions because it seemed to diminish their
rights to engage in strike action, the Court nonetheless quickly became the
hub around which employment relations revolved in early twentieth
century NSW. Despite this, it was several years before the ITEA and the
USB confronted each other in this arena. While initially (1903) the USB
looked on the Court as being sympathetic to the claims and rights of craft
unions, by 1905 it reassessed this view, and encouraged ‘‘any Union that
could get a fair agreement with their employers to accept it rather than
fight the case out in the Court’’. Taking its own advice, the USB managed
to extract itself from the arbitral proceedings initiated by the ITEA, and
come to an out-of-court agreement with the employers.54 These agree51. For the details of employers’ proposals, see Sydney Morning Herald, 13 November 1903, p.
7; 19 November 1903, p. 7; Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1903, p. 7.
52. Ibid.
53. Sydney Morning Herald, 13 April 1904, p. 2.
54. ‘‘September Quarterly Report’’, enclosed in USB Minutes, 21 November 1905.
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ments made little qualitative change in the status or condition of
commodified labour.
The capacity of the USB to avoid the state’s industrial tribunal was
brought to a halt by the revisions to the arbitration system that were the
result of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1908. While historians often
describe the Industrial Disputes Act as significant for its coercive antiworking-class provisions, it provided employers such as the ITEA with
less obvious, quieter, and ultimately more significant advantages over
organized iron trades labour.55 Although the Act recognized the role of
unions in arbitration, it positioned them rather differently than had been
the case since 1901.
The 1901 Act automatically gave unions and employer associations an
important structural position at the centre of the arbitral process; the 1908
Act diminished this centrality by instituting wages boards defined by
specific industry, and gave primacy to that industry’s employers and
employees, rather than simply to unions and associations. The Industrial
Disputes Act thus reoriented the direction of arbitration away from a
forum for negotiation between institutions, and towards shaping conditions of industry; and in doing so it provided an important mechanism for
employers to contest and ultimately erode many of the established
principles underpinning craft unionism.56 These changes greatly enhanced
the capacity of employers such as the ITEA to confront historically rooted
claims of the USB. As a union advocate put it, whereas the 1901
Arbitration Court only considered ‘‘claims by different classes of mechanics, and you did not deal with any industry [:::]. It is only under this
Industrial Disputes Act, which enables a Board to be granted for the
articles to be made, that [employers] could possibly claim’’ that those
employed making rolling stock were not skilled tradesmen.57
These capacities for occupational redefinition that the USB referred to
opened up a whole new world of possibility for the ITEA. Several ITEA
members who manufactured rolling stock applied to the Industrial Court
to be considered an ‘‘industry’’ in their own right, and were allowed to be
55. This understanding of the 1908 Industrial Disputes Act is based on J.H. Portus, The
Development of Australian Trade Union Law (Carlton, VIC, 1958), pp. 110–111; H.V. Evatt,
William Holman, Australian Labour Leader, abridged edn (Sydney, 1979), pp. 167–169; Turner,
Industrial Labour and Politics, pp. 35–38; Edna Ryan, Two Thirds of a Man: Women and
Arbitration in New South Wales 1902–20 (Sydney, 1984), pp. 24–36; Raymond Markey, In Case
of Oppression: The Life and Times of the Labour Council of New South Wales (Sydney 1994), pp.
139–140.
56. Ryan, Two Thirds of a Man, p. 28; Buckley, The Amalgamated Engineers, p. 178.
57. Industrial Court of New South Wales: Appeal by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers,
the Australian Society of Engineers, the Amalgamated Coachmakers’ Society, United Society of
Boilermakers, Iron Workers’ Assistants against Award of Coachmakers’ Board (hereinafter
Appeal against Award of Coachmakers’ Board), August 1910, vol. 99, NSWSA 2/151, address of
Mr Tayler, p. 288.
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considered a part of the coachmaking industry, whose conditions were
governed by the Coachmaking (Rail) Board.58 The key purpose in their
doing so was to establish that the court recognized a difference between
boilermakers’ work in rolling stock manufacturing and that in general
engineering firms.59
It did not take long before it became evident that allowing firms within
the ITEA to appear before the Coachmakers’ (Rail) Board, posed a real
threat to the trade status of skilled iron trades workers in general.60 As a
union advocate analysed the situation :
[:::] because the Industrial Disputes Act is passed [:::] the employers set up [i.e.
claim] that ‘‘we are a separate industry, [::: and] the man who is working on a
railway wagon is a railway wagon smith’’. The man who is working on a coach
would be, I suppose, a coachbuilding smith, and the man who is working on a
locomotive would be a locomotive blacksmith, and so it would go until the
engineers, taking them as an example of the trade, would be split up into every
class there is of an article to be manufactured and they would no longer be
engineers, but they would be the particular smiths or the particular engineers in
the article they were making.61

This was principally the dynamic against which all the iron trades
unions, including the USB, were fighting when they appealed against the
Coachmakers Award. It was best summed up by the argument of Tayler,
the advocate for the Iron Moulders’ Union, who commented that the
Industrial Disputes Act ‘‘enables the Court to appoint a Board to deal with
an industry’’, and thereby allows employers to argue that: ‘‘these men are
no longer mechanics in their particular trade, [:::] no longer tradesmen as
defined by their particular Unions, but tradesmen classified by the
particular work which they are doing. [The Act allows the Court] to
separate tradesmen from their particular class of trade which they call
themselves’’.62
Tayler’s remarks (in this and the preceding extract) cast light deep into
the interior processes of labour commodification that were now unfolding
under these new conditions. Tayler’s analysis indicated the importance of
eroding the salience of union-based artisanal structures and occupational
classification, because doing so made work the focus of arbitration, rather
than workers and their collective self-definitions. This was the term
58. Industrial Court of New South Wales: re Iron Trades (Boilermakers) Board. Transcript.
Application for Nomination of Members (hereinafter Boilermakers’ Board – Nomination of
Members), vol. 83, 1909, NSWSA 2/136. See the exchange between Heydon and Wegg-Horne,
pp. 53–54.
59. Ibid., p. 53.
60. ITEA Minutes, Special Extraordinary Meeting, 28 June 1909, Metal Trades Industry
Association archives, Minute Book 1.
61. Appeal against Award of Coachmakers’ Board, Tayler, p. 286.
62. Ibid., p. 289.
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‘‘objectification’’ made concrete and real: separating the work itself from
the body and identity of the worker allowed the objectification of work –
literally giving skills and abilities an object form that they previously had
not, when they had been contained within the interior of the body and
identity of the artisan, and protected there by the carapace of craft
unionism.
As Tayler’s critical assessment of the new situation had anticipated, the
ITEA immediately began taking advantage of the new possibilities for
fracturing the unitary classifications within the USB. They first did so by
arguing that the industry was differentiated into two ‘‘essentially different
interests’’ – shipbuilding versus structural and bridge work – and that the
latter had become ‘‘a specialty with certain firms and certain classes of
workmen’’. The ITEA pounced on evidence produced in court comparing
work between the two sections, which showed that ‘‘the work of riveting,
in connection with bridge and girder work, was by no means of so high a
character as that which has to be put onto Boilermaking, and Iron
Shipbuilding’’.63
These developments within the Industrial Court unsettled the USB,
which now began to struggle hard to maintain the integrity of key concepts
such as that of the ‘‘trade’’. Evidently worried about the comparisons
across the newly defined industrials sections, the USB requested Mr
Blackett, the chair of the Coachmakers’ Board, to at least ‘‘put the iron part
[of railway wagon making] under the Boilermakers Board, and if unable to
do that to keep the evidence of all trades separate and distinct’’.64 Blackett
refused these requests, and in February 1910 handed down the first
Coachmakers’ (Rail) Award.65 Some idea of the importance of it can be
gained from the official response of the USB, whose Secretary described
the award as ‘‘a scandalous and ridiculous one’’, because Blackett had
‘‘altered the term ‘Plater’, which has been in use for the past 70 years, to the
term ‘Assembler’, and has reduced the wages of those workers’’.66 This was
the classic nexus between classification and commodification, enabled by
the changes in the terms of engagement within the state’s industrial
tribunals.
Blackett’s award pleased the ITEA to the same degree – and for
precisely the same reasons – that it angered the USB. The Award meant
that several ITEA members could now undertake rolling stock-making,
free of the wages and conditions established by the craft unions. More
importantly, it also provided employers in general engineering and
shipbuilding with important ammunition to attack the standard wage,
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 5 October 1909.
65. New South Wales Government Gazette, No. 164 of October 26 1910.
66. ‘‘Secretary’s Report, for the Half Year to 30th June 1910’’, enclosed at USB Minutes, 9
August 1910.
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by eroding the credibility of USB’s long-standing claim that all its
members were equally skilled. The ITEA secretary explained the
importance of Blackett’s Award to the Association’s overall aim: although
the work considered by the Coachmaking Board ‘‘was not actually
included in the Industry of Iron Trades, still it dealt with the features of
riveting plates etc. claimed by the Boilermakers’’. The evidence showed
‘‘that the men who did riveting only, were not held to be Boilermakers, and
therefore not entitled to Boilermakers’ wages’’.67 The ITEA’s annual
report for 1909/1910 described how that the Coachmakers’ Board had
been important for all members of the ITEA,
[:::] because this class of work and workmen were graded. This was markedly to
the benefit of the Iron Trades in subsequent proceedings in connection with the
Boilermakers. It was held that a wagon riveter was not a boilermaker or
shipbuilder and (as the Boilermakers’ Board would shortly be sitting) the
countervailing claims put in by the Association were for classification and
grading.68

The possibilities illustrated in the Coachmakers’ Board propelled the
ITEA further towards the strategy of classification. In the next case in
which it was involved, (vs the Moulders), the ITEA Secretary rather
smugly reported to the members that the claims put forward by the ITEA
‘‘had astonished the Employees’ Union on account of the grading which
had taken place’’.69 The ensuing Award instituted ‘‘grading’’ of iron
moulders, and thus reiterated to the ironmasters the value of pursuing
‘‘grading’’ more generally within the Wages Boards.70 In March 1911 Irons
explained to ITEA members that the results of the Moulders’ Board
indicated ‘‘how very necessary it was for employers now to insist on
Grading wherever applicable’’. Franki – always the avatar of grading –
went even further, commenting that ‘‘[w]ithout [grading] [:::] it would be
difficult indeed to carry on’’, and that ‘‘members could rest assured that the
Association would pass that claim in every case’’.71
Making good this promise, from 1911 the ‘‘grading’’ of skilled
boilermaking occupations was the central point at issue between the
ITEA and the USB. When the ITEA was formulating its strategy in the
Boilermakers’ Board hearing in early 1911, Franki suggested that while the
employers might make ‘‘some little concessions’’ on issues like payment
for meal breaks or additional payment for working in hot places ‘‘of course
as to grading and the wages for the different grades they must stand firm’’.
67. ITEA Minutes, March 14 1910.
68. Ibid., Special Extraordinary Meeting, 13 May 1910.
69. Ibid., 10 October 1910.
70. New South Wales Industrial Gazette, July, 1912, pp. 460–464.
71. The statements in this paragraph are drawn from ITEA Minutes, General Meeting, 7 March
1911.
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Other members supported Franki’s tactics and especially ‘‘his remarks as
to grading and the wages for the different grades’’, referring to grading as a
‘‘necessity’’.72
While there were many intervening circumstances between the
articulation and the realization of the goal – for example, World War I
disrupted the process – nonetheless the trajectory towards ‘‘grading’’ and
its connection to objectives of commodifying boilermaking labour was
unmistakable. First articulated in 1890 and then given a practical trial in the
1901 dispute, during the 1920s USB members were ‘‘graded’’ and paid on a
scale of wages according to the different levels of skill that their labour was
deemed to embody.73 Reflective of this new terrain, Judge Curlewis in
1919 described as ‘‘a farce’’ the hallowed old craft union principle ‘‘that
because a skilled labourer has been employed on particular work [:::] that
when an unskilled labourer can do it that skilled labourer is still to be
employed’’, and concluded that ‘‘I shall never countenance the flat rate [i.e.
standard wage]. I shall set every class of man on his own merits.’’74
CONCLUSION

In their luminous beacon of contemporary working-class studies, Linebaugh and Rediker remark critically on the way historians take for granted
basic phenomena, such as fields, cities, ports, plantations, and ‘‘the
commodities of commerce’’, as though these things are just given in
history rather than wrought out of a dramatic process of expropriation and
exploitation.75 Labour commodification occupies a similar historiographical position, as an assumed part of the background. Yet, as this study of
the boilermaking trades has illustrated, labour commodification was a
dynamic and continuous point of conflict between employers and
workers. Boilermaking labour had taken the commodity form since the
1850s, but this was the start, not the end, of the story. From the 1870s,
boilermaking workers and employers struggled to control the intensity of
labour commodification. For about thirty years, the upper hand in that
struggle lay with the USB, which constructed itself as a classic craft union
and was able to enforce the standard wage and project itself as a
community of equally skilled workers, despite differences in degrees of
specialization. Throughout this time, the ironmasters continually but
72. Ibid., ‘‘Special Meeting in re. Boilermakers’’, 27 April 1911.
73. For these transformations see Sheridan, Mindful Militants, pp. 73–107. Also see Sandra
Cockfield, ‘‘Arbitration, Mass Production and Workplace Relations: ‘Metal Industry’ Developments in the 1920s’’, The Journal of Industrial Relations, March 1993, pp. 19–38, 26–27.
74. Quoted from ‘‘Skilled Workers Doing Unskilled Work’’, New South Wales Industrial
Court, 4 December 1919, re Brass Finishers’ Award, NSWSA, 7/1857.
75. Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra, p. 42.
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unsuccessfully attempted to penetrate the defences that the workers had
erected.
The strategy of labour commodification pursued by the ironmasters was
principally aimed at breaking down the collective controls over occupational classification that the boilermakers had developed since 1870. In the
case of the boilermakers, the decisive moment in the struggle to intensify
the commodity character of labour came when the USB was finally forced
to engage with the arbitration system. While, to be sure, systems of state
regulation of labour relations, such as those in New South Wales in this
period, were complex and multivalent institutions, in this case it seems
clear that the preparedness of the arbitration courts to support the
employers’ classificatory efforts, proved a decisive turning point in the
struggle over the intensification of the commodity character of boilermaking labour.
That this was the case ought not be seen in any simple or conspiratorial
sense as reflecting the class role played by the state industrial court system.
While the arbitration court did give decisive support to the ITEA’s
strategies of occupational classification, longer-term developments were to
indicate that the process of labour commodification was far more
contradictory than this. By breaking apart the USB’s standard wage, and
finding degrees of skill spread across the occupational continuum, the iron
trades employers were also unwittingly creating the ground on which
workers hitherto classified as ‘‘unskilled’’ could now claim a degree of skill.
It was precisely these conditions that allowed the leader of the ‘‘unskilled’’
boilermakers to claim in 1915 that their work was ‘‘highly skilled’’, and to
make aggressive new claims on this basis for wage increases. 76
It is this contradictory aspect that makes it difficult to resolve the
process of labour commodification into a simplistic story of class relations.
While labour commodification closed down older ways of doing things –
as in the case of the craftsmen boilermakers – it simultaneously opened up
new possibilities for other categories of workers. Thus, in 1939 an observer
of Australian labour attributed the success of trade unions in increasing
wages in the preceding decades to ‘‘[t]heir policy [which] has been to
minutely classify grades of work, and to attribute to the workers in the
different grades some degree of skill’’.77 Although this overstated the level
of material success of the strategy, it accurately identified the principal
mechanism through which it was prosecuted. Commodification was a
double-edged sword and its principal technique – occupational classification – could cut both ways.
76. Royal Commission of Inquiry on Industrial Arbitration in the State of New South Wales,
New South Wales Parliamentary Papers 1913, Second Session, I, q. 16886.
77. G. Anderson, ‘‘Industrial Tribunals and Standards of Living’’, in F.W. Eggleston et al.,
Australian Standards of Living, (Carlton, VIC, 1939), pp. 65–112, 75–76.

